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Abstract 
A dynamic model of inter-governmental competition for investment is 
presented, where the investment represents a potentially large source of tax 
revenue for the local governments, and the local productivity of investment is 
uncertain. A single firm decides where to locate its new plant in each period 
by conducting an auction, soliciting bids from the local governments. 
Equilibrium subsidies from the !oca! governments are derived, as �Jell as 
conditions under which the firm will switch locations between periods. 
A second issue addressed in this paper is local government strategic 
investment in infrastructure. We consider a two-stage game in which local 
governments first choose a level of infrastructure (which is costly to build), 
then participate in the sequential auction described above. It is shown that, 
even if the costs of building the infrastructure are the same in each 
location, in equilibrium the local governments will choose different levels of 
infrastructure and the region which chooses the highest level will be better 
off. Moreover, when the level of infrastructure is endogenous in the manner 
described, federally administered programs designed to increase the level of 
infrastructure in the less attractive region will make the firm strictly 
better off, without necessarily increasing the payoffs to either of the two 
local governments. 
INTRODUCTION 
Intergovernmentai competition tor private investment is a pervasive 
phenomenon. Locai incentive prpgrams, designed to attract investment, are
common in most OECD countries. When large investment projects are being 
considered, local governments will often go further by tailoring firm-specific 
tax/subsidy agreements. In Canada, for example, the Quebec provincial 
government recently provided $5 million (Canadian) in subsidies to Hy�ndai
Auto Canada Inc., in return for building a new plant in that province. In 
recent years intergovernmental competition for large capital projects such as 
this has become fierce: in the United States, municipalities have been said to 
enter "bidding wars" using firm-specific agreements to attract plants. For 
example, Mazda Motor Corp. actively solicited bids from various local 
governments in the U.S. when deciding where to locate its new plant. It 
finally accepted an offer from Flat Rock, Michigan worth $120 million (U.S.), 
prompting the mayor �ho negotiated the deal to denounce the process as 
"industrial blackmail".� This paper presents a model which analyses this 
process, using the theoretical framework of sequential auctions. 
The existing literature on tax competition is voluminous, but it focusses 
primarily on incentive programs that apply to any firm that is considering 
doing business in t,tie region, rather than on firm-specific agreements for
particular projects. In a seminal paper, Doyle and van Wijnbergen (1984) 
modelled a firm which bargains with different governments sequentially in a 
bilateral monopoly setting. This model was used to provide an explanation of 
tax holidays. A similar approach was used by Bond and Samuelson (1986). Both 
these papers assume that the firm deals with only one local government at a 
time, rather than negotiating simultaneously with several governments. Black 
and Hoyt (1989) consider simultaneous negotitations, but their analysis is 
essentially static, in that the location choice is a once-and-for-all 
decision. In this paper we present a multi-period model with simultaneous 
negotiations between the firm and the different local governments at each 
point in time. We model the bidding process formally as an auction in each 
period. This allows for the possibility that the firm will switch the 
location of its plant after an initial period, when some information about 
local productivity conditions has been revealed. It also allows for a clear 
characterization of the size ot subsidies as a function ot expected 
productivity differentials and sunk costs. 
Another issue addressed in this paper is local government investment in 
infrastructure. For exampie, government investment in roads, bridges, and 
ports can affect the expected profits available to firms locating plants in 
that region. Similarly, local regulations concerning trade union activity, 
environmental conditigns, land use by-laws, and so on can affect private
investment decisions. We consider a two-stage game in which local 
1In the United States, a handbook is available outlining the various incentive
programs availble in the different states. (See National Association of State 
Development Agencies, et. al., (1983).) Chandler and Trebilcock (1986) survey 
the regional incentive programs implemented in different OECD countries. 
2The Financial Post, July 5, 1989, p.3.
3The Globe and Mail, August 26, 1989, p.B1.
4For a comprehensive survey of the tax competition literature, see Wildasin
(1986). 
5A rather notorious example of this sort of behaviour was the 1979 amendment
of the Nova Scotia Trade Union Act which required that any unionization in a 
governments first choose a level of infrastructure (which is costly to build), 
then participate in the sequential auction described above. It is shown that, 
even if the costs of building the infrastructure are the same in each 
location, the regional governments will choose different levels of 
infrastructure and the region which chooses the highest level will be better 
off. Moreover, when the level of infrastructure is endogenous in the manner 
described, federally administered programs designed to increase the level of 
infrastructure in the less attractive region will make the firm strictly 
better off, without necessarily increasing the pay-offs to either of the two 
regional governments. The layout of the paper is as follows: section II 
presents a two-period model where a firm solicits bids, in each period, from 
local governments when deciding where to locate its plant. Section III 
extends the model by allowing the governments to first choose a level of 
infrastructure. section IV uses the model to analyse the effects of 
interregional transfers. Finally, section V presents a conclusion, and some 
suggestions for flffther research. 
II. BIDDING WARS BETWEEN REGIONS 6
There are two regions (A and BJ which compete for the firm's plant, in 
each of two time periods. Locating a plant in either region requires a sunk 
cost of k; thus, if the firm relocates between periods, it incurs the cost 
twice. The surplus available in either region, denoted yi' i 
= A,B, is
uncertain prior to actual production in that region. It is common knowledge 
that 
y i = xi + 
£ i i = A, B ( 1) 
where £A and £B are iid with common distribution function F( · ) and associated
density function f(-) = F' (-). We assume 
E£i = 0 and F(O) ;,; 0.5, (2)
where E denotes expectations. All parties are risk-neutral, and regional 
governments seek to maximize expected tax revenues. All agents share a common 
discount rate, {J. 
The sequence of decision-making and information revelation is as follows. 
At the beginning of the first period, F( · ), xA, and x9 are common knowledge;
neither the firm nor either regional government has any private information 
about actual surpluses within either region. Based on the (common) 
expectations about available surp uses, the regional governments participate 
in an ascending-bid oral auction.  The governments' "bids" are subsidy 
manufacturing company with two or more "interdependent" manufacturing 
locations within the province must be done on a company wide basis, rather 
than plant by plant. It has been alleged that this was done to encourage 
Michelin Tires to build a third plant in that province. (Tupper, (1986)). 
6The model in this section is similar to the one in King and Welling (1989).
The models differ in two respects: KW consider only two possible values of 
productivity in each region, and allow for the possibility that the type of 
the firm is unknown. The model here allows a much more general distribution 
of productivity in each region, but eliminates any consideration of a matching 
problem between the firm and a region. The major results are unchanged. 
7 Note that sealed bid auctions are not renegotiation proof, as the firm may be
induced to play one region off against another to obtain a better price, 
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packages offered to the firm; a package determines the sharing of the surplus 
between the firm and the regional government. Once the firm has chosen a 
location, and incurred the fixed cost k ,  the actual surplus in the chosen 
region is revealed to all three decision-mak ers, production takes place and 
the first period surplus is divided between the firm and the winning 
government. As the firm does not produce in the region which did not win the 
first Pr{iod auction, nothing is learned about the surplus available in that 
region. At the beginning of the second period, the regional governments 
again enter an auction to determine the firm's second-period location. If the 
firm chooses not to move, no additional information is revealed; if it 
relocates, the surplus in the second region is revealed once the fixed cost 
has been incurred in that region. Once the firm's decision has been made, 
production occurs, and the second-period surplus is divided. 
Given the sequencing of actions and information revelation, first period 
decisions are based on expectations of second period decisions. Moreover, 
second period decisions are based on a comparison of k nown with uncertain 
outcomes. In setting up the agents' first period objective functions, it will 
prove convenient to use the following function: 
00 
µ(z) " Emax{£,Z} = zF(z) + J £f(£)d£ (3) 
z 
The expectation is taken with respect to the random component of production in 
the location chosen in the first period. At the time of the second period 
auction, the actual value of this random variable is common k nowledge. The 
expected value of the random component in the other location is zero (by (2)). 
Hence, the relocation decision is based on a comparison of (xi+ £i) and (xj-k),
(where i denotes the location of the firm in period 1 ). Relocation will not 
raise the expected available surplus if (xj-k ) < (x i+£ i) or £i > x(xi-k .
Therefore an important determinant of the first period decisions is Emax{£i'
xj-xi-k}. Note that
µ' (Z) = F(z) E [0, 1] (4) 
It is assumed that no agent can commit to future actions. The model is 
therefore solved recu rsi vei y. 
Period g 
Assume the firm located in region i in period 1. The second period
surplus available in region i, y. = x. + £., is therefore k nown to all agents. I I I 
Since no information has yet been gathered on the other region, region j, the 
common expectation of the surplus available there is Eyj = xj' Relocating the
plant in the second period means incurring the fixed cost k again, so the 
relevant payoff in region j is the expected net surplus, x.-k . Given these
J 
possi bi! ities, the second period auction generates the fol lowing pay-offs to 
resulting in an oral or second price auction. It can be shown that although 
the firm would prefer a sealed bid first price auction, the regions are better 
off under the oral auction. 
8In KW, observation of the first period surplus provided additional
information about the firm's type. 
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the firm and the two regional governments, respectively:9
firm receives min{yi, xj-k } (5a) 
region i receives max{O, yi-x/k } (5b) 
region j receives max{O, x.-k -y. } (5c) J I 
The results of the second period auction can now be used to derive the results 
of the first period auction: the initial location choice of the firm, and the 
net subsidy offered by the winning region to the firm. 
Period 1 
Consider first the bidding strategy of region A; region B's strategy can then 
be derived by symmetry. If region A wins the first period auction, 
thusbecoming reg'1on i in period two, the expected surplus over the two periods 
is 
SwA = E
{xA+£A - k + /3max{O, xA+£A-xB+k}} (6) 
= (1+/3)XA - (1-/3)k - /3xB + f3µ(xB-xA-k )
10
In all cases, expectations are taken with respect to £A' since the expectation
with respect to £B was taken in the calculation of (5b). If region A does not
win the firm in the first period, it becomes region j in period two, and the 
expected surplus over the two periods is then 
Here the expectation is taken with respect to £B' since this will be revealed
once the firm has established its plant in region B Jn the first period. 
(7) 
In the first period auction, the maximum region A will bid is that amount 
which leaves it indifferent between winning and not. This gives region A's 
bid as 
bA = SWA - S,f,A = xA - k + 
/3[xA-xB+k +µ(xB-xA-k)-µ(xA-xB-k )]
By symmetry, region B's maximum bid in the first period will be 
Notice that the two regions' maximum bids are identical if xA = x8, and each
region's maximum bid is strictly increasing in its own expected surplus: 
(8) 
(9) 
9An ascending bid auction has the article being purchased for a price equal to
the second highest value, by the bidder with the highest value. In this model 
each regional government is willing to offer a tax/subsidy package which 
allows the firm to retain at most the entire expected surplus, net of the 
fixed cost. For a survey of auction theory, see McAfee and McMillan (1987). 
10 Note that, for any constant a,
Emax{a+c, O} = a + Emax{E, -a} = a + µ(-a) 
Emax{a-£,0} = E[a-£ + max{£-a,O}] = E[a-£-a + max{£,a}] 
= -E£ + Emax{£,a} = µ(a) since Ee = 0. 
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8bA
ax A
= 1 + /3[1 - F(x -x -kl - F(x -x -k)] > 011B A A B ( 10) 
The corresponding partial for region B is completely symmetric. Therefore the 
region with the larger expected surplus has the larger maximum bid, and wins 
the firm in the first period. 
Without loss of generality, we assume xA > x8. It follows that region A
wins the firm in the first period. Let pA denote the price region A actually
pays for the firm ex ante (ie. the firm's payoff 1n period 1 is pAJ. This is
equal to the maximum bid region B could offer, so 
( 11 ) 
In the first period, the firm receives the surplus (net of the fixed cost), 
plus any net subsidy from the regional government. This subsidy will be 
positive if PA exceeds (xA- k), the expected net surplus. The distribution of
the surplus in the first period can now be summarized. 
Proposition 1: 
Suppose xA > x8. Then in the first period the firm locates its
plant in region A, and receives an ex ante net subsidy of a, given 
by 
a(fi,k) = -(1+/3)LI + /3[k + µ(Ll-k) - µ(-Ll-k)],
where k is the fixed cost, and LI = xA- x8 > 0. The subsidy is
increasing in k, and decreasing in LI, the difference in expected
regional surpluses. If a < O, the firm contributes to the regional
government's tax revenues in the first period. 
Proof: In the first period, the regional government of region A 
receives (xA-k-pA); the firm receives pA. The net subsidy to the
firm is therefore a = p A - (xA-k); (14) is derived using (11 ).
Denoting the partial of a with respect to variable j by aj, and 
using (4), 
a6 = -(1+/3) + /3[F(Ll-k) - F(-Ll-k)] < O
ak = /3[1 - F(Ll-k) + F(-Ll-k)] > O 
(12) 
( 13a) 
( 13b) 
II 
The value of the net subsidy received by the firm in the first period is 
given in Proposition 1. It is also shown that the subsidy is increasing in
the sunk cost, and decreasing in the difference in the expected surpluses of 
the winning and the losing regions. Both these results accord with intuition. 
The higher the sunk cost, the less mobile the firm once it has built a plant 
and, from (5a), the lower the firm's expected pay-off in the second period. 
Hence the greater must be the initial subsidy to induce the firm to locate in 
11This uses (4) above.
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either region. The greater is t:,, the greater the relative advantage of the
more productive region, and therefore the larger the share of the surplus in 
that region which can be retained by the regional government without losing 
the firm. 
Since the subsidy depends upon the distribution of the e's, without 
I 
specifying F( · ) it is not in general possible to determine whether the firm
receives a positive or negative net subsidy for particuiar (k,6) pairs. Tne 
following corollary to Proposition 1 shows that when regions are identical ex 
ante, the subsidy will be positive for any positive sunk cost. 
Corollary: 
If the regions are identical ex ante, the firm will receive a net 
subsidy from the government in the region it chooses so long as 
there is some sunk cost involved in building a plant. The more 
disparate the regions, the greater must be the fixed cost for the 
firm to receive a subsidy. 
Proof: From (12), a(O,k) = /3k > 0, and
dk 
= 
0
6 - --a
k 
= 
+ /3 - /3[F(f;-k ) + F( -f;-k)] ( 14) 
df; a constant 
ll[ 1 - F(f;-k ) + F(-f;-k ) ]
"' 1 iff 1 "'2/3F(-f;-k ) 
which holds since F(-f;-k) ,; F(O) ,; 0.5 by (1 ). 
Ill 
This result is also intuitive: so long as k is strictly positive, the region 
which wins the firm in the first period has an advantage in the second period. 
The first period value of this advantage is /3k , and this is bid away to the 
firm in period 1 through Bertrand competition. Although the firm receives a
subsidy in the first period, this subsidy is repaid through second period 
taxes, provided the firm stays in the region. The firm will move in the 
second period only if £A is sufficiently below zero - in particular, below
( -f:,-k ). 
Although the fixed cost is a barrier to mobility in the second period, it 
is not absolute: once the actual surplus available in region A is revealed, 
the firm must decide where to produce in the second period. If £A is high,
the firm will not move, but a low actual surplus in period 1 may cause the 
firm to switch locations1�n the second period. The probability of moving toregion B in period 2 is 
( 15) 
Provided the support of F( · ) is large enough, there is a positive probability
of switching locations in the second period. This probability is strictly 
decreasing in both k and £:,; ex ante, relocation is less likely the higher is
the fixed cost of building a plant, and the greater is the disparity between 
the mean surpluses in the two regions. We state this as a proposition. 
12Recall that by assumption t:, = (xA-xB)"' o, so the firm chooses region A in
period 1. 
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Proposition g: 
Given enough uncertainty about the available surplus, there is a 
positive probability that the firm will move in the second periodto 
the other region. Switching locations is less likely the greater 
is the fixed cost, and the larger is the difference between the 
expected surpluses in the two regions. 
This positive probability of switching is reflected in the determination 
of the subsidy. From (12), the subsidy is strictly increasing in 
[µ(A-k)-µ(-A-k)]; using (2), this can be approximated in terms of the 
probability of switching : 
r A-k
µ(ll-k)-µ(-ll-k) = J µ' (z)dz = 
-A-k 
A-k r 
J F(z)dz 
-A-k 
E [2AF ( -ll-k ),2AF (ll-k)] (16) 
Loosely speaking then, the larger i1 Jhe probability of switching, F(-A-k),
the larger the subsidy tends to be. 
Because we have modelled this as a two-period game, the firm can never 
expect to receive a net subsidy in the second (final) period. However, ex 
post net subsidies to newly attracted firms are consistent with our model. 
This model makes no predictions about the form of the net subsidy granted to 
the firm; in particular, a given level of expected taxes could be obtained by 
a number of combinations of lump-sum subsidies and tax rates. If the firm 
does move to region B in the second period, it pays expected net taxes of T 28,
where 
T2B = XB - k - XA - CA 
(This is calculated from (5a).) This could be achieved by any combination of 
a lump-sum (L) and a marginal component ('r) such that the region's total
expected revenues were equal to 
T 28 = 1:(x8-k) - L
The taxes actually paid by the firm would be equal to T(y8-kJ; if realized
productivity in region B turn'!� out to be low, the ex post subsidy to the firm
could turn out to be positive. 
The analysis above has assumed uncertainty about the surplus available in 
either region. The following Proposition summarizes the predictions of this 
analysis for the special case of full and perfect information. 
Proposition �: 
Suppose there is no uncertainty about the surplus available in 
either region. Then the firm locates its plant in region A in the 
first period, and stays there. The net subsidy to the firm in the 
13This is not a causal relationship. For example, ceteris paribus a decrease
in A will increase both the probability of switching and a, fo1- any given F. 
14rn 1987 the Newfound land government offered a $15 mi 11 ion (Canadian) package 
to the Sprung Environponics cucumber greenhouse. (The Calgary Herald, May 12, 
1 987, p. C1) The company accepted this offer, and left Calgary for St.
John's. The firm proved to be no more successful in Newfoundland than it had 
been in Calgary, and the December 1988 crop failure precipitated a political
upheaval in Newfoundland. The analysis in this paper suggests that the 
Newfoundland government's offer may have been rational ex ante. 
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first period is 
0 
= 
{ /3k - ( 1 +/3)Li 
-Li 
Li ,; k 
Li > k 
Proof: 
In the certainty case, ci 
= o, so µ(z) = 
{ 0 z 
z z 
Substituting this into (1 2) yields the subsidies 
III. INFRASTRUCTURE AS A STRATEGIC VARIABLE
< 0 
;,; 0 
above. 
• 
It was assumed in the previous section that the expected surplus in
region i was exogenously determined. In general, we observe regional 
governments creating legal and capital infrastrutui'?s which are intended toimprove the climate for business in their regions. In this section we add a 
prior stage to the two-period game above, and allow regions to make costly 
investments which increase x.. We show that the assumed difference between 
I 
the regions can arise endogenously, and the regions' equilibrium decisions 
break ex ante symmetry. 
Before the first period bidding begins, region i can create x. at cost I 
Y(Xi), where y( · ) is increasing and strictly convex. If the initial position
has xA = xB = 0, then expenditures by region A increase Li, region B's
expenditures decrease Li, and equal expenditures by both regions leaves Li
unchanged. The pay-offs to region A from investing in xA are
Using (6), (7), and (1 1 ), this can be rewritten as
{
(1 +2/3)Li + /3[2/J(-Li-k) - p(6-k)J 
rr (x J = A A flp(Li-k) 
if n > o 
if Li < 0 
( 1 7) 
By symmetry, region B's pay-off from investing in xB can be obtained from (1 7)
by replacing Li (-Li) with -Li (Li). 
The Nash equilibrium to this game has each region choosing the level of 
its own investment which maximizes its expected net pay-off, taking the 
expenditure level of the other region as given. The first step in describing 
the equilibrium is Lemma 1 :  
Lemma 1: If the regions are identical at the beginning of the game,
there does not exist a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium to the 
investment game. There does exist an asymmetric pure stategy 
equilibrium. 
Proof: Region A chooses xA to maximize rrA - r(xA)' taking xB as given.
1 5Black and Hoyt (1 989) cite examples of offers of a public school and a
robotics institute. See also foot-note 5. 
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Evaluating the partial of the objective function wrt xA at !::. = 0
yields 
J (1 +2fl) - 3flF(-I•,) - r'(xA)l flF(-k) - )'' (XAJ
This partial is equal to zero at!::.= o iff 1+2fl = 4flF(-k), Since
F(O) ,;; o, 4flF(-k ) ,;; 2fl < 1+2fl, so this condition is never
satisfied. 
( 18) 
Given Lemma 1, we focus on asymmetric pure strategy equilibria and assume 
x A > XB.
From the regionr6 optimization problems, assuming !::. > 0, the Nash choices
of investment satisfy 
region A: '((xA*) 
= 1 + 2fl - fl[2F(-/::.-k) + F(/::.-k)] ( 19a) 
region B: r
'(x8*
J 
= flF(-1::.-k) (1 9b) 
* * Since )'(x) is convex, and F(O) ,;; 0.5, these expressions yield xA > x8
,
E,¥en though region A wins the firm in the first period, region B may choose 
x8 > 0, since higher values of x8 raise the probability that the firm will
choose to switch locations in the second period. 
In equilibrium, region A wins the firm in the first period, but does so 
as a consequence of greater expenditures to attract the firm. In spite of 
these greater costs, there is no ambiguity in the rank ing of the expected 
rewards: the region which makes the greater investment to attract the firm has 
the larger expected pay-off. To see this, let rri(xi l xj) denote the expected
pay-off of region i as a function of x. given region j has chosen x.. Then, I J 
rrA(XA* l x8*) - )'(XA*) "- rrA(x8*1x8*) - )'(x8
*) > rr8(x8*1XA
*) - y(x8*)
The first inequality follows because region A chooses xA* opt'1mally given x8*,
while the second holds because region B's pay-off is strictly decreasing in xA
and xA* > x8*.
The results of this analysis are summarized in Proposition 4. 
Proposition B:: 
If regional governments are able to mak e costly investments which 
increase the expected surplus available from locating a plant in 
their regions, and this investment is equally costly in each 
region, then in equilibrium the regions will choose different 
levels of investment and, hence, will not be equally attractive to 
16Th' . h 1s section assumes t at
optimal plans are satisfied. 
flf(-1::.-k ) - r"cx; J < o at /::.
the second order conditions for the regions' 
That is, 2flf(-/::.-k) - flf(/::.-k ) - y"(x: ) < 0 and
* * = xA- xB.
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firms. The region which makes the higher expenditure will be 
better off. 
IV. REGIONAL SUBSIDIES AND INTER-REGIONAL TRANSFERS
The analysis of the previous section showed that competition between the 
regions for large capital investment could generate a situation in which the 
region which made the greater effort to attract a firm would be better off. A 
common feature of federal states is some form of equalization grants and/or 
regional incentive program, where the federal government transfers wealth 
between lower levels of government in order to encourage the development of 
regional industrial bases. Although the model in this paper cannot provide a 
full analysis of such programs, some consequences of regional subsidies can be 
examined. 
Consider amending t77 model of the previous section to incorporate
subsidization of region B. There are two obvious forms of subsidization to 
consider: lump-sum grants, and matching subsidies. With lump-sum grants, the 
value of x8 increases by the amount of the grant, independent of the level of
}'(xB); with matching grants, the regional government must still make some
expenditures from its own budget. Either of these will have the effect of 
raising the level of region B's investment for any given level of xA. Region
A's reaction function is implicitly defined in (19a) above; totally 
differentiating this condition with respect to xA and xB, and rearranging,
yields 
/i[f(l.1-k) - 2f( -l.l-k)] 
dx8 y" (XA*) + /i[f(l.1-k) - 2f(-l.l-k)]
(20) 
Assuming the SOC for a maximum is satisfied, the denominator of the expression 
in (20) is positive. The numerat?§ may be positive or negative, depending
upon the particular distribution. If it is positive, the entire expression 
is positive, but less than unity. This implies that although subsidization of 
the region which is less attractive to foreign capital does induce the more 
attractive region to undertake additional investment to maintain its relative 
attractiveness, the compensation is less than full. If the numerator is 
negative, but l.I is still positive, then subsidizing the less developed region
will lower A's optimal level of infrastructure. In either case, the 
subsidization reduces the disparity between the regions. 
The only agent who is certain to gain from this subsidization is the 
firm, which is able to extract a larger payment from the regions. Recall 
that, from Proposition 1, the net subsidy to the firm is decreasing in !!.: the
more disparate the regions, the less the winning region must pay to bribe the 
firm to choose it rather than the poorer region. By making the regions more 
alike, the subsidy to the poorer region increases the price the firm can 
extract in the auction, and hence reduces the share of the surplus which 
remains in the regions. The subsidy does resuit in a larger total surplus; 
however, it is easy to show that the winning region will be made worse off 
17we ignore the source of this subsidy, and view it as manna from heaven. A
more complete treatment of subsidies would be explicit about financing. 
18For instance, it is strictly negative for a uniform distribution.
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overall. From (17), region A's pay-off is rrA(XA*) - '/(XA*); totally
differen tiat:n g this with respect to xB' usin g (20) an d (19a), yields
d[nA ( xA*)-r(x,c..
*l]
= 
Although subsidization of the poorer region does succeed in decreasing 
the gap between the region s, it is n ot n ecessari I y the case that the poorer
region ben efits from such tran sfers. In the secon d period, only if £A is
sufficiently low will the firm move to region B. Subsidization of region B 
increases F(-ll-kJ, the probability of relocation , as well ar9the secon d periodtax revenues of the poorer region if the firm does move. 
This an alysis assumes that the only benefit from win n in g  the firm is the 
in creased tax reven ues. In practice, the subsidization of region B and the 
in duced in vestmen t in region A may have employmen t ben efits which outweigh the 
gain s of the firm. Moreover, if the subsidization makes the region s more 
attractive to other firms, the loss on this single firm may be a n ecessary 
cost. Of course, r(x) could be in terpreted as costs n et of these ben efits. 
V. CONCLUSION AND EXTENSIONS 
In ter-governmen tal competition for lumpy capital can take man y forms. In 
this paper we presen t a multi-period model in which local governments compete 
via auction s for a plant bein g built by a single firm. Since a sun k cost is 
incurred when the plan t is built in the first period, mobility in subsequent 
periods is limited, giving the first period winn er a secon d period advan tage. 
This allows the region in which the firm initially locates to extract a share 
of the surplus produced in subsequen t  periods, without fear of the firm bein g 
bid away to an other region. The firm trades these future tax payments for 
current subsidies and tax concession s. The magnitude of the subsidy is 
increasing in the level of the sun k cost, an d decreasin g in the disparity 
between the reg ions. 
Within this framework we also analyze regional governments' incen tives to 
in vest in in frastructure to make their regions more attractive to outside 
capital. It is shown that differences between the region s emerge 
en dogenously, and attempts (by a federal authority, say) to reduce these 
differences may merely tran sfer ren ts to the firm. 
In this paper, regional governments face a two-period budget constraint: 
an y n et subsidy paid to the firm in the first period must be balanced by 
expected n et taxes in period two. Black an d Hoyt (1 989) presen t a on e-period 
model in which locai govern ments' bids for capital projects are finan ced by a 
reduction in the tax burden of curren t citizen s. In their model, the local 
governments provide public goods which have relatively large fixed costs. 
With declin in g average costs for the public good, the larger labour force 
which the in vestmen t attracts lowers the per capita tax of the citizens, an d 
the subsidy to the firm does n ot require an in crease in n et taxes. 
Although Black an d Hoyt do allow for some uncertainty about the relative 
productivity of the firm in a particular location , they do n ot con sider the 
complication s in troduced by the possiblity of plant relocation on ce actual 
productivity is revealed. The con temporai1eous financin g of an y subsidy makes 
relocation irrelevan t in their model. In our model, the possibility of 
t<=1This can be seen from (5c).
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relocation is an important determinant of the price actually paid by the 
winning region in the first period, and there is a positive probability that 
a fil-m which experiences a low outcome in the first period will be courted and 
won by another region. Future research which blended these two models would 
allow for a richer description of the consequences of intergovernmental 
competition, and analysis of the effects of various policies within federal 
states. 
Another possible extension could introduce a sequence of firms which 
approach the two regions. If the firms can be of different types, then it may 
be possible to have an equilibrium where the regions specialize in the type of 
infrastructure that they offer. 
12 
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